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I was immediately drawn to ƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐƚŝƚůĞ ?ƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇƚŽĂ favourite essay by Henry 
Maier, a seminal author in Child and Youth Care.  tŚĂƚDĂŝĞƌ ?Ɛ The Core of Care and this book have 
in common is their effort to distil the literature into central tenets of their respective topics ?DĂŝĞƌ ?Ɛ
topic was developmental theory; ŽůůŝŶƐ ?ŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉĂŐĞƐ ?ƐŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĐĂƌĞ
ĞƚŚŝĐƐĂƐ ?ĂƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƐŚĂĚŽǁǇĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŬŝƌƚƐŽĨĚĞďĂƚĞƐŝŶĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐŵŽƌĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?
More mainstream moral theories, she argues, tend to have theoretical slogans.  For example, 
 ? ?Đ ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐƚƐŵĂǆŝŵŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĚĞŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ
certain rights and abide by certain duties; and virtue ethicists cultivate flourishing characƚĞƌƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?
Essentially, ŽůůŝŶƐ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ is to identify ĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ƐůŽŐĂŶ ?^ŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐďǇĚŝƐƚŝůůŝŶŐ
existing care ethics literature into its central components  W four key normative claims  W and then to 
unify, specify and justify these claims, crystallising care ethics ? conceptual core and bringing it into 
mainstream analytic moral theory. This involves taking care ethics from its political and practice 
origins and developing it using analytic (and often abstract) moral reasoning. 
 
Collins ? central argument is that care ethics is a prima facie, compelling moral theory and has, like 
any other coherent moral theory, a core normative commitment that she endeavours to identify and 
justify.   Her concern is ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ŶŽƚŝƚƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ?
(p.12).   As a result, the book reads much more like something I would have studied as an 
undergraduate philosophy major than the reading, thinking and writing on care ethics I have 
subsequently done as a practitioner and academic.  The following excerpt serves as an example: 
This thought is expressed differently by different theorists, but the general idea is that 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ,݀ in a context, C, will include so much detail about C that none of the reasons will 
apply to other contexts.  So, we cannot generalise beyond C if we are to explain why the 
ŵŽƌĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽ݀ in C are (or are not) weighty enough to generate a moral reason (even a 
non-ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŽŶĞ ?ƚŽ݀ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
To be fair, tŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞďŽŽŬ and for the most 
part, ŽůůŝŶƐ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƐĐůĞĂƌ and engaging.  She offers enough explanation to take the reader with 
her, using recognisable illustrative examples.  For instance, she offers the following to illustrate that 
responsive to care should not be taken as essential to care:   
[S]uppose ŝƐŝŶĂĐŽŵĂ ?ĂŶĚĞĂƌŶĞƐƚůǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽŵĞĞƚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ǀĞŶŝĨ
ŶĞǀĞƌǁĂŬĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽŵĂ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂƌĞĚĨŽƌ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
actions should constitute care. (p.77) 
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For those unconcerned with the place of care ethics within analytic moral philosophy, the first of the 
ďŽŽŬ ?ƐƚǁŽŵĂŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ will still be of value.  It offers a critical survey of the last thirty years of care 
ethics literature, providing the unfamiliar reader with an excellent introduction to its main 
arguments.  Collins also persuasively argues that this literature can be distilled into the 
aforementioned four key claims, which each comprise a chapter. 
 
Chapter two ƐƚĂƌƚƐǁŝƚŚĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƉrinciples 
and its emphasis on sympathetic engagement with the unique particulars of each situation.  Collins 
counters sweeping claims in the literature against universal principles and instead argues for their 
compatibility with sympathy.  Indeed, the attempt to arrive at some form of equilibrium between 
relevant principles and the feelings and interests of those involved chimes with a phenomenology of 
moral deliberation.  Principles are sometimes necessary to prevent us from being blind to other, 
morally relevant considerations not necessarily reflected in our immediate sympathies in a given 
situation.  At the same time, the disposition and even activities involved in sympathetic engagement 
are necessary for the moral application of principles.  This leads ƚŽŽůůŝŶƐ ?ĨŝƌƐƚŬĞǇĐůĂŝŵ ?ƚŚĂƚ
 ?ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇƐŚŽƵůĚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĂŶĚĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƚƚĞŶĚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
The next key claim, developed in chapter three, is derived from care ethics ? central focus on 
relationships, positioning personal relationships as central to moral experience.  The purpose of this 
claim is to define, based on the literature, which relationships should be valued and why.  Collins 
argues that the importance of ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚ be defined by their value to participants.  This 
enables a ruling out of some (e.g. abusive relationships) and expanding the consideration beyond 
simply the instrumental or extrinsic, all leading to her ƐĞĐŽŶĚŬĞǇĐůĂŝŵ ? ?dŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
have value to individuals in the relationship, relationships ought to be a) treated as moral paradigms, 
b) valued, preserved or promoted (as appropriate to the circumstances at hand), and c) 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚĂƐŐŝǀŝŶŐƌŝƐĞƚŽǁĞŝŐŚƚǇĚƵƚŝĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Chapters four and five focus on caring attitudes and caring actions, respectively, and claims they 
each have value distinct from one another.  Collins defines what caring attitudes are, explores the 
circumstances in which they have moral value, and tackles potential objections to an ethical theory 
calling forth any attitudes on the part of the moral actor.  Similarly, she defines care, gives an 
account of the ways in which caring actions are morally valuable, and clarifies the role of the care 
recipient.  These form the basis of her remaining key claims: 3)   ?ĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐĂůůƐĨŽƌ
ŵŽƌĂůůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞĐĂƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĐĂƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐŽƌŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂ
caring attitude; and 4)  ?ĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĐĂůůƐĨŽƌŵŽƌĂůůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞĐĂƌŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?(p. 80). 
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In the second section ŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?ŽůůŝŶƐƐĞƚƐŽƵƚ ?ƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞǁŚĂƚĂƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ ?ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚ
ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐŵŝŐŚƚůŽŽŬůŝŬĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶǁŚĂƚƐŚĞĐŽŝŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?
This normative principle is the core of her title  W the core of care ethics.  Still drawing from the 
literature, she offers a compelling argument for dependence as a unifying basis for care ethics 
before diverging from it ƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚŝƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŽŶŝƚƐŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ŝŶthe following two 
chapters.  Chapter six sets out the relations and conditions under which dependency-related duties 
come into existence.  Here we get deep into the territory of analytic moral theory.    The most 
concise rendering of a dependency principle can be found on p. ? ? ? ? ?ŝĨĂŶĂŐĞŶƚ ?ŽƌƐĞƚŽĨĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƐ
well placed or best-ƉůĂĐĞĚƚŽŵĞĞƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚ ?ƐĞƚ ?ŚĂƐƚŚĞĚƵƚǇ
ƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞƐƚŚĂƚĨŽůůŽǁ ?ŽůůŝŶƐƚŚĞŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐŬĞǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
including what is meant (and not meant) by dependency, important interests, well-placed and best-
placed.  In doing so, she attempts to offer a coherent basis upon which care ethicists can agree while 
debating the applied specifics of which interests matter more, for example, or what is too much to 
ask of a moral agent.  Chapter seven extends the consideration of the dependency duties from 
individuals to groups, with Collins arguing that collectives, including states and multinationals, bear 
dependency duties.  These collectives are not entities external to individuals who constitute them; 
rather, collective dependency duties are ŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĚƵƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞƐ
in the collective.  This inclusion, then, enables Collins to assign ethical responsibility to both 
individuals and groups in relation to dependency duties.   
 
The final chapter goes about answering the following three questions: whether the dependency 
principle assigns 1) some responsibilities, 2) enough responsibilities, and 3) the right explanation of 
the responsibilities alluded to in relation to the four key normative claims identified in the first part 
of the book.  Collins offers detailed answers to each, in the final analysis arguing all of her identified 
key claims are ultimately claŝŵƐĂďŽƵƚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?dŚƵƐĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůƐůŽŐĂŶŝƐ
 ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? (p.169).   
 
In laying out her argument for this project, Collins acknowledges those care ethicist who oppose the 
idea that care ethics can be crystallised into a core normative commitment (or slogan).  To their 
concerns that something important may be lost by encompassing care ethics into abstractions, she 
argues that without such a core, the question remains whether care ethics is actually a moral theory 
at all: 
As long as care ethics is simply a collection of statements that have been made by people 
ǁŚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽĐĂůůƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĐĂƌĞĞƚŚŝĐŝƐƚƐ ? ?ŝƚǁŝůůďĞƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĂƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚ
what is not.  There is no way to know if a new claim made by a self-proclaimed care ethicist  
ŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĐůĂŝŵƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚĂƐ
they are not truly care ethical. (p.3) 
All moral theories employ some degree of logical argument to address the messy details of moral 
dilemmas, not just care ethics.  In offering an analytically constructed normative core for care ethics, 
Collins is not arguing that all care ethicists will agree about exactly which cases should generate 
which duties, but that all care ethicists can agree that the dependency principle (or something akin 
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ƚŽŝƚ ?ŚĂƐŵŽƌĂůǁĞŝŐŚƚ ?ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞƐŵŽƌĂůĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŚĞƌĨŽƵƌŬĞǇĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ?ĞǆĂĐƚůǇ
ǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƚŚĂƚǁĞŝŐŚƚ ? ?  
 
While this will likely be a challenging read for those not accustomed to reading analytic philosophy, 
its rewards include not just a stronger grasp of care ethics and its coherence as a moral theory, but 
the analytic workings of moral theory more generally.    
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